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2 Assessing Progress 
toward Greater 
Equality of 
Income Distribution 
Gary S. Fields 
Income distribution is only one indicator of economic well-being useful in 
gauging improvements in the economic position of the poor; change in in-
come distribution, appropriately conceived and measured, is as good a 
criterion as any for assessing progress toward the alleviation of poverty. In-
come is intimately bound up with a family's command over economic 
resources. Rising modern-sector employment or reduced infant mortality 
might be suggestive of improvements in the economic position of the poor; 
gains in real income among low-income groups provide direct evidence that 
poverty is being alleviated. 
This chapter answers the following questions: 
What are the strengths and limitations of alternative income concepts? 
"Greater equality of income distribution" implies an increase in the in-
comes of the poor in developing countries relative to the income of the 
nonpoor. Relative-inequality measures dominate the existing literature 
on income distribution and economic development. What are the main 
lessons from these studies? 
Is it desirable to use relative income measures to assess the welfare of 
the poor and progress of public policies in meeting objectives of equity? 
Are indicators based on absolute incomes and poverty possibly more 
appropriate? 
Are reliable and accurate data available, on a regular basis, to measure 
the various indicators? 
What recommendations, taking into account cost and other considera-
tions, can be made on the reporting of recommended indicators? 
In the first section of this chapter we examine the usefulness of the con-
cept of income distribution. Current income is not an ideal measure of 
economic welfare. It represents the best available compromise between con-
ceptual suitability, on the one hand, and data availability on the other. Sup-
plementary data on wealth, housing conditions, infant mortality, and other 
economic indicators are useful adjuncts where available. 
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The second section deals with alternative ways of studying the income-
distributional effects of economic development. Inequality measures show 
up as unsuitable indicators of change in the welfare of the poor. Two 
families of alternative indicators, based on absolute- and relative-poverty 
measures, are shown to be superior. A simple numerical example dem-
onstrates differences among the three approaches. With this as a guide, we 
can decide which measure is most appropriate as a criterion for assessing 
progress toward improving the economic position of the poor. 
The next section of the chapter is a review of the literature on relative in-
come inequality: cross-sectional relationships between income inequality 
and the level of development; major findings of studies of the correlates of 
inequality; and evidence on changes in income inequality within a given 
country over time. The analyses reviewed rely on the usual tools of the 
trade—Lorenz curves, Gini coefficients, income shares of the richest and 
poorest percentages—all of which measure relative income inequality. 
The fourth section breaks new ground with a direct examination of ab-
solute incomes and poverty. A family of alternative indicators is used to 
measure the number of persons whose incomes are less than an agreed-on 
poverty line and the average incomes among this low-income group. These 
alternative indicators suggest a markedly different assessment of the actual 
experiences of two countries—Brazil and India—that have so far not been 
subjected to absolute-poverty analyses. 
The next section outlines requirements for theory and data to imple-
ment the absolute-poverty approach. In that section we also discuss the ex-
tent to which reliable and accurate data are available on a regular basis to 
measure the various indicators. 
Income as an Indicator of Economic Well-Being 
The usefulness of income equality as a criterion for assessing progress and 
commitment toward economic development hinges on the assumption that 
income is a meaningful indicator of economic position. Two standards for 
gauging the usefulness of the income measure are conceptual suitability, on 
the one hand, and data availability on the other. 
Economic well-being is related to the goods and services one consumes; 
and consumption, in most cases, depends on income. 
It is easy to think of exceptions to these generalizations: the cripple who 
derives less satisfaction from goods and services than the fortunate who are 
well-endowed physically; the young couple who receive large and frequent 
gifts from their parents; the rich with large asset holdings who finance their 
consumption out of their wealth rather than from their earnings; and the 
peasant family that grows and consumes its own food and has little or no 
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cash income deriving from the sale of a marketable surplus. In all these 
cases, cash income is an inaccurate measure of the individual's or family's 
command over economic resources. At issue is the severity of the inac-
curacies, some of which are undoubtedly more worrisome than others. 
Income-distribution statistics in LDCs take only some of these con-
siderations into account. Health status and intrafamily gifts are examples of 
a broad range of considerations that never enter into income-distribution 
data. The costs of worrying about these factors far outweigh the benefits. 
On the other hand, adjustments for home-produced consumption and in-
come from wealth are often made, and with good reason, since these factors 
together affect the economic position of large numbers of income recip-
ients. 
Income-distribution figures typically measure money income received 
during a month or a year. For example, the U.S. census asks for income 
received in the previous year, but since the census is conducted only at ten-
year intervals, in the interim the census bureau regularly reports income 
data derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of some 47,000 
households. Income is defined as follows: 
Data on income collected in the CPS are limited to money income received 
before payments for personal income taxes and deductions for Social 
Security, union dues, Medicare, etc. Money income is the sum of the 
amounts received from earnings; Social Security and public assistance 
payments; dividends; interest; and rent; unemployment and workmen's 
compensation; government and private employee pensions; and other 
periodic income. (Certain money receipts such as capital gains are not in-
cluded.) Therefore, money income does not reflect the fact that many 
families receive part of their income in the form of non-money transfers 
such as food stamps, health benefits, and subsidized housing; that many 
farm families receive non-money income in the form of rent-free housing 
and goods produced and consumed on the farm; or that non-money in-
comes are also received by some nonfarm residents which often take the 
form of the use of business transportation and facilities, full or partial 
payments by business for retirement programs, medical and educational ex-
penses, etc. [U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976c] 
Many economists have questioned the conceptual suitability of such 
figures. Taussig (1973), for instance, cites nine reasons why the standard an-
nual money-income statistics published in the United States fail to provide 
an adequate measure of economic well-being; he computes alternative 
measures based on these adjustments. The factors considered are: 
1. The census money-income measure excludes nonmonetary income 
receipts. 
2. These figures are reported on a before-tax rather than an after-tax 
basis. 
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3. No account is taken of price differences in various cities or regions of 
the country. 
4. Income is reported for family units defined by the census, generally 
with no allowance made for variations in family size or composition. 
5. The figures contain no information on the distribution of net worth. 
6. Data are presented for a single year; a longer time horizon might 
distinguish permanent from transitory components. 
7. No account is taken of differences in leisure. 
8. These income figures exclude capital gains, benefits from government 
services, and other supplements to one's income and consumption. 
9. The figures are reported for the census-defined family unit rather than 
for a "pooling consumer unit." 
In studies of LDCs, researchers have wrestled with these and other 
issues in seeking to arrive at a "correct" distribution of income for a less-
developed country. The most eminent researcher in this area is Simon 
Kuznets (1963,1976); see also the work of Bronfenbrenner (1971, pp. 31-38) 
and Szal (1975). 
From these and other writings emerge three points of consensus: 
1. When appropriately defined, measured, and adjusted, income is an 
analytically valuable guide to economic status. 
2. The family is a more appropriate recipient than the individual. 
3. A number of adjustments to annual (or monthly) cash income are in 
order. 
Of course, statistics on income (whether national, sectoral, or in-
dividual) are often seriously inaccurate. A particularly negative view is ex-
pressed by Averch, Denton, and Koehler (1970) with respect to income data 
in the Philippines. A less pessimistic assessment is presented by Altimir 
(1975) for Latin American income data, although he does point to tenden-
cies for income reported in censuses and surveys to understate national in-
come by 10-20 percent or more. These and other reviews of data reliability 
should serve as a warning to those who unquestioningly accept the authority 
of respected scholars and who uncritically utilize data compilations. 
The usual types of figures on incomes, although less than ideal in many 
respects, may serve as a useful guide to changes in the economic position of 
the poor. The remainder of this chapter suggests ways to take income-
distribution considerations into account, within the limits of existing data. 
Alternative Approaches to the Study of 
the Size Distribution of Income 
Income distribution is not the same thing as income equality or inequality. 
"By personal distribution we mean division of income (or wealth) by size, 
Equality of Income Distribution 51 
or more precisely, by size brackets of the income or wealth of economic 
units" (Bronfenbrenner 1971, p. 27; emphasis in the original). Bronfen-
brenner carefully distinguishes between the personal distribution of income 
and statistics such as the coefficient of variation that "measure the degree 
of inequality of a personal income distribution" (p. 43; emphasis added). 
The distinction between income distribution and income equality (or in-
equality) is an important one. Contrast the way we usually think about in-
come distribution with the way we are accustomed to think about the 
distribution of other economic or social data, such as the distribution of 
education. 
When we consider education, our concern is with how many people 
have attained how high a level. If a larger fraction of a population achieves 
literacy, for example, we are inclined to regard that country's education 
system as having done "better." In making such a judgment, we usually do 
not think to ask whether more people have also completed university; nor 
do we compute a statistical measure of inequality of educational at-
tainments, such as the variance or a Gini coefficient. Rather, our strategy is 
to pinpoint a target group whose upgrading we care most about and then to 
measure the rate of absolute improvement within that target group. 
In studies of income distribution, the approach is ordinarily quite dif-
ferent. Most studies ask: "Did income distribution worsen?" Typically, 
that question is answered by examining either (1) how the income shares of 
particular deciles (or other groupings) changed; (2) how the Lorenz curve 
shifted; or (3) whether measures such as Gini coefficients, variance of in-
comes or their logarithms, and so on, exhibit greater or lesser inequality. All 
these are relative-inequality measures. In effect, then, by beginning with 
relative-inequality measures rather than with absolute levels, the approach 
to studies of the distribution of income reverses the approach to studies of 
the distribution of other economic and social goods. 
Relative Inequality Approach 
Most studies of income distribution in LDCs measure relative income in-
equality, conveniently illustrated by a Lorenz curve in figure 2-1. The 
Lorenz curve depicts the income share of any cumulative percentage of the 
population, ordered from lowest income to highest. All relative-inequality 
measures in current use are based on the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient, 
being most directly related, is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the 45° line (area A in figure 2-1) to the total area (A + B). The Gini 
coefficient varies between zero and one. The higher the coefficient, the 
greater the degrees of relative inequality. The fractile measures in common 
use, such as the income share of the poorest 40 percent or the richest 10 per-
cent, can be read directly from the Lorenz curve. A class of relative-inequality 
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Figure 2-1. Lorenz Diagram 
measures may be calculated from the data contained in Lorenz curves. These 
include many familiar indexes such as the variance (or standard deviation) of 
income or its logarithm, the coefficient of variation, the Kuznets ratio, the 
Atkinson index, the Theil index, and many others (Sen 1973). 
In using one or more of these inequality measures, the judgment is 
typically made that social welfare (W) depends positively on the level of na-
tional income (Y) and negatively on the inequality in the distribution of that 
income (/). For example, taking the share of income of the poorest 40 per-
cent of the population (5) as an index of equality and the Gini coefficient 
(G) as an index of inequality, these studies would hold that W is positively 
related to Y and S and negatively related to G. The terminology of these 
studies is indicative—falling S or rising G are given the nonneutral term 
"worsening of the income distribution," and rising levels of measured in-
equality are generally considered a bad thing. 
A numerical example shows how these judgments are brought to bear in 
practice. 
Equality of Income Distribution 
Example 1 
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Country 
Both countries 
initially 
Country A 
later 
Country B 
later 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
9 
18 
Share of Lowest 
40 Percent: 
Level 
0.363 
0.333 
0.307 
Percentage 
Change 
- 8 
- 1 5 
Gini 
Level 
0.082 
0.133 
0.162 
Coefficient: 
Percentage 
Change 
+ 62 
+ 97 
Country B grew twice as fast as country A. However, its income distribu-
tion, as measured by the Gini coefficient and income share of the lowest 40 
percent, seems to be "worse" than that found in country A; that is, it would 
appear that the rich benefited at the expense of the poor, whose relative in-
come share deteriorated. A development economist might question whether 
the higher rate of growth in country B was "worth it" in terms of income 
distribution, and a well-meaning development planner seeking to give very 
high weight to alleviation of inequality might go so far as to choose country 
A's policies over those of country B. 
Absolute-Poverty Approach 
An alternative approach directly examines a country's progress in 
alleviating poverty among the very poorest. Absolute-income studies of 
LDCs are the exception rather than the rule. Economists at the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, have been taking an absolute-
income approach for some time (International Labour Office 1970). More 
recently, the World Bank has begun to shift its focus as well (Ahluwalia 
1974). These studies are noteworthy precisely because they do differ from 
the usual approach. 
We must first define poverty: an individual is poor if his or her income 
falls below a specified dollar amount, with analogous figures for families of 
different sizes. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), for 
example, uses the figure U.S. $150 per capita (1969 dollars) in LDCs; in the 
United States, the official poverty line in 1976 was $5,500 for a nonfarm 
family of four. The poverty lines used in different countries and the ways 
they are determined are discussed in subsequent sections. Let us denote this 
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poverty line, which we will hold constant in real terms, by P*. "The poor" 
are those whose incomes are less than P*. 
Most observers would share the following judgments about the extent 
of poverty (P): 
1. P is positively related to the number of income recipients with incomes 
below the poverty line P*. 
2. The larger the average income of those below the poverty line, the lower 
is P. 
3. If other things are unchanged, the more unequal the distribution of in-
come among the poor, the more severe is P. 
In most studies, measures entering into these three judgments are computed 
separately. However, Sen (1976) combines these measures and argues 
elegantly for the use of a composite index. 
Absolute-poverty measures like those just presented have been used in 
research in the United States for many years; see, for example, Bowman 
(1973) or Perlman (1976). The main advantage of absolute-poverty indexes 
is that they provide direct measures of changes in the numbers of the poor 
and the extent of poverty among them. Note, in contrast, that although 
poverty indicators can be computed from Lorenz curves or Lorenz-curve-
based inequality measures, this information is obtained only indirectly and 
often with considerable computational difficulty. 
To see how the absolute-poverty approach is applied, let us consider 
now another numerical example for two countries in an early and a later 
stage of their economic development. Assume the following hypothetical 
figures, where the poverty line is somewhere between $1 and $2: 
Example 2 
Percentage of Labor Force in: 
Country 
Both countries 
initially 
Country C later 
Country D later 
High Wage Jobs 
(Real Wage = 2) 
(%) 
10 
20 
30 
Low Wage Jobs 
(Real Wage = 1) 
(*) 
90 
80 
70 
Rate of Growth of 
Modern Sector 
("Modern Sector 
Labor Absorption 
Rate") 
(Vo) 
100 
200 
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The poor in both countries received the benefits of growth, but in country D 
twice as many of the poor benefited. Other things being equal, development 
economists would almost certainly rate country D as superior, and develop-
ment planners would seek to find out what had brought about that 
country's favorable experience and to adopt those policies in their own 
countries. In this second example the preference is clear-cut, while in the 
previous example the issue was open to doubt. 
Relative-Poverty Approach 
The relative-inequality and absolute-poverty approaches are the two main 
ways in which distributional aspects of economic development have been 
considered. In addition, there is now a newer approach being promulgated 
by researchers at the World Bank and elsewhere, known as the relative-
poverty measure (Chiswick 1976). This figure is the absolute income (in 
constant dollars) received by the poorest 40 percent of the population. The 
choice of poorest 40 percent is purely arbitrary. What matters in this ap-
proach is the constancy of population share along with income variability 
among members of that group. 
Consider now a third example: 
Example 3 
Country Absolute Income of Poorest 40 Percent of Population 
Both countries 
initially $40 
Country E later 40 
Country F later 40 
Using the relative-poverty measure, it appears that there was no improve-
ment in absolute income of the poorest 40 percent in either case. One might 
ask: Why grow if the poor do not share in the benefits of growth? In this 
third example, E and F both seem to have failed to alleviate poverty. 
Comparison of the Three Approaches 
In point of fact, countries A, C, and E are the same country, as are coun-
tries B, D, and F! Real-world economic-development histories and policy 
projections are often presented in these different ways. Yet, as these ex-
amples make clear, how income distribution is studied—whether in terms of 
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relative income inequality (as in example 1), absolute incomes and poverty 
(example 2), or relative poverty (example 3)—may dramatically influence 
our perceptions of the outcome. 
Specifically, we have encountered the following differences in our ex-
amples. According to the absolute-poverty criterion, B-D-F clearly 
dominates A-C-E on both growth and distribution grounds. Using the 
relative-inequality criterion, it is difficult to judge; although B-D-F grew 
faster than A-C-E, its income distribution seems to have worsened. Finally, 
by the relative-poverty criterion both appear unsatisfactory; neither country 
seems to have made progress in alleviating poverty, although in fact poverty 
was being alleviated in both, at different rates. 
The relative-poverty measure fails to record an income-distribution 
change. These countries were alleviating poverty, yet the relative-poverty 
measure is totally insensitive to the change. Relative-poverty measures are 
unsuited for gauging the distributional consequences of the growth il-
lustrated in this two-country comparison. Difficulties with the relative-
poverty measure arise in cross-sectional data, where we look at those who 
are the poorest 40 percent ex post at different times, disregarding the move-
ment of specific individuals into and out of the poorest 40 percent. 
Longitudinal data would permit tracing the progress of individuals who 
rose out of the poorest 40 percent. Unfortunately in the real world, we do 
not have longitudinal data for LDCs. An illustration of movement up and 
down the U.S. income scale appears in chapter 1. 
The relative-inequality and absolute-poverty approaches yield 
somewhat different answers as to whether a pattern of growth is desirable. 
Whether poverty is relative or absolute is a value judgment. Statistical pat-
terns that in some respects are artifacts also affect comparison of these ap-
proaches. 
What is it about the process of economic development that produces a 
discrepancy between the different approaches? 
Do we give greater weight to the alleviation of absolute poverty or to 
the narrowing of relative income inequality? 
The answer to the first question is that the discrepancy is produced by the 
unevenness of economic development itself. An economy grows by enlarg-
ing the size of its modern sector. Incomes and wages within the modern and 
traditional sectors remain far apart, and neither rises. This type of growth 
affects only some of the poor—those who shift from the traditonal to the 
modern sector. Those whose situations are not improved by this type of 
growth remain as poor as before, receiving the same income, which is 
now, however, a smaller part of a larger whole. The absolute incomes of 
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the poorest 40 percent may be unchanged. The Lorenz curve shifts 
downward at its lower end. Lorenz-curve-based measures of relative income 
inequality that are sensitive to the lower end of the income distribution 
register a "worsening" of the income distribution. 
The pattern of growth illustrated is widely regarded as an essential in-
gredient of development. In their famous Development of the Labor 
Surplus Economy (1964), Fei and Ranis wrote: " . . . the heart of the 
development problem may be said to lie in the gradual shifting of the center 
of gravity of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial 
sector . . . gauged in terms of the reallocation of the population between 
the two sectors in order to promote a gradual expansion of industrial 
employment and output (1964, p. 7)." This characterization is echoed by 
Kuznets (1966). Empirical studies, such as that of Turnham (1971), docu-
ment the absorption of an increasing share of the population into the 
modern sector as growth continues. In a case study of Indian economic 
development in the 1950s, Swamy (1967) found that 85 percent of the 
change in the size distribution of income was due to intersectoral shifts 
(namely, growth in importance of the urban sector and growing per-capita-
income differential between the urban and rural sectors) and only 15 per-
cent to changing inequality within the two sectors. Modern-sector enlarge-
ment comprises a large and perhaps predominant component of the growth 
of currently developing countries. 
The choice between absolute- and relative-income measures depends on 
basic ethical considerations. The plight of the poor in LDCs is objective; 
they do not command sufficient resources to feed and clothe themselves and 
avoid disease. Poverty is an absolute condition, requiring analysis in ab-
solute terms. The predominant emphasis must be given to data on changes 
in the number of poor people, the average extent of their poverty, and the 
degree of inequality among them. 
Others have different concerns and make different judgments, giving 
great weight to the subjective feelings of the poor, who may feel relatively 
worse off if the economic positions of others are improving while theirs are 
not. Observers who feel strongly about such relative-income considerations 
are justified in using relative-inequality measures. 
What may not be justified—and there are many examples of this in the 
development literature—is the coupling of a concern about the absolute 
economic misery of the poor with a reliance on calculations of changes in 
relative inequality over time. This approach may be mistaken, misleading, 
and logically inconsistent. For just as in the numerical example above, the 
assignment of heavy weight to changes in the usual indexes of relative in-
come inequality and the interpretation of these increases as offsetting the 
economic well-being brought about by growth, may lead to the overlooking 
of important tendencies toward the alleviation of absolute poverty. 
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Many observers would contend that the goal of economic development 
is to alleviate absolute poverty. If that is the goal, it seems logical to 
measure progress toward that goal directly, using absolute-poverty criteria, 
rather than indirectly, with relative-inequality or relative-poverty indexes. 
The numerical example in this section showed how differences among the 
various approaches may arise. If students of economic development or 
policy makers use relative-inequality measures when they really care about 
absolute poverty, they may be misled. 
Income Inequality and Level of Development 
The initial work on size distribution of income across countries is that of 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets (1955). Comparing India, 
Ceylon, Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and the United States, he 
observed greater inequality in the developing countries. The pattern of 
greater relative income inequality in the LDCs than in the developed coun-
tries was confirmed in a subsequent paper by Kuznets (1963) for eighteen 
countries. 
Based on that evidence, Kuznets formulated the "inverted-U hy-
pothesis," which states that relative income inequality rises during the early 
stages of development, reaches a peak, and then declines in the later stages. 
Kuznets assumed that LDCs had greater equality in their earliest stages of 
development, because all were equally poor. No data were available to test 
this speculation. Even today, suitable data do not exist; see Kravis (1973, p. 
71). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Adelman and Morris gathered new 
data for forty-three developing countries. In their 1973 book, they 
presented considerable evidence on the correlates of relative income in-
equality. By means of analysis of variance, they found six factors to be im-
portant in explaining variations in relative income inequality. Included 
among these was the level of economic development. 
A short while later, Paukert (1973) tried to refine the Adelman and 
Morris estimates. He discarded information that he considered particularly 
unreliable, added some new countries for which good data had recently 
become available, and presented summary information on the size distribu-
tion of income in fifty-six countries. For each of several alternative relative-
inequality measures, Paukert found that inequality begins at a compara-
tively low level, reaches a peak in the $301-500 per-capita-income countries, 
and then diminishes at higher incomes. Thus, the inverted-U pattern is 
reconfirmed. 
From this evidence, many development economists arrived at the view 
that "income distribution must get worse before it gets better." There was 
considerable pessimism over the supposed trade-off between growth and in-
come equality. This interference is based on cross-section data, not on 
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historical trends. In their introduction, Adelman and Morris used such 
words as "preliminary," "exploratory," and "tentative" to describe their 
caution in interpreting results. Few countries offer direct evidence on 
income-distribution change over time. 
A second problem with the inverted-U is that we are dealing with 
averages among groups of countries and not, for the most part, with the in-
formation on individual countries themselves. Figure 2-2 presents Paukert's 
data in graphic form (Paukert 1973, table 6). Individual data are indicated 
by asterisks, and averages for each income class of countries by heavy 
circles. There appears to be much more variation in relative inequality 
within country groups than between them. Before regarding the inverted-U 
pattern as inevitable, therefore, even in the cross section, we need to know 
how well the inverted U fits the data. 
By means of multiple-regression analysis on individual-country data, 
we may determine (1) whether an inverted U is the appropriate characteriza-
tion of the inequality-income relationship, and (2) whether any particular 
pattern of inequality change over time is inevitable. On both accounts, the 
evidence suggests that income distribution need not get worse before it gets 
better. 
In the individual-country data collected by Paukert, we can define six 
dummy variables denoting income class, the first for GDP per capita be-
tween $101 and $200, the second between $210 and $300, and so on. (The 
reason for defining only six dummy variables when there are seven 
categories is to avoid perfect multicollinearity in the regression equation 
reported below.) For each, we assign the value 1 if the country's GDP places 
it in that category, 0 otherwise. If we then run a multiple regression with the 
Gini coefficient of inequality as the dependent variable and these six dum-
mies as independent variables, the coefficients on the dummy variables may 
be interpreted as the effect on the Gini coefficient of being in that income 
group rather than in the $0-100 per-capita-income group. If the inverted-U 
hypothesis is correct, these coefficients will be positive and increasing up to 
some point, declining thereafter. 
The results of the regression based on the figures for fifty-six countries 
were: 
GINI = 0.418 + 0.507
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Figure 2-2. Gini Coefficient and Gross Domestic Product per Capita, Fifty-six Countries 
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where Ydenotes GDP per capita (standard errors in parentheses). The pat-
tern of regression coefficients is consistent with the pattern predicted by the 
inverted-U hypothesis, that is, rising at first and then falling. However, the 
initial stage of rising inequality is not statistically significant at any of the 
conventional levels. (Compare, say, the first three regression coefficients 
with their standard errors.) 
Worse still for Kuznets, Paukert, and other adherents of the inverted-U 
hypothesis are the results of a simple parabolic regression. The inverted-U 
hypothesis may be tested by regressing the Gini coefficient on GDP per 
capita and GDP per capita squared. If the relationship is in fact of the 
inverted-U form, GDP per capita would have a positive coefficient, and 
GDP per capita squared a negative coefficient. The regression results were: 
GINI = 0.473 - 0.00003GDP - 0.00000GDP2 R2 = 0.11 
(0.56) (0.34) 
(t statistics in parentheses). 
The negative coefficient on GDP in Paukert's data is contrary to the initial-
worsening hypothesis. 
This result is not suited to the choice of inequality measure or data set. 
Cline (1975) reports the results of a similar regression using Adelman and 
Morris's data rather than Paukert's, and using as the measure of inequality 
(7) the ratio of the income share of the top quintile to the share of the bot-
tom quintile. His results, with t statistics reported in parentheses, were: 
/ = 7.23 + 0.0258GNP - 0.000014GNP2 R2 = 0.12 
(0.7) (2.8) 
In any case, the initial-worsening hypothesis receives at best only limited 
support in the data. 
Concerning the inevitability issue (the view that "income distribution 
must get worse before it gets better"), we should note how little of the 
variance in relative inequality is explained by income level. In the dummy-
variable regression, income level can explain only 22 percent of the inter-
country variation in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, and in 
the parabolic regression, only 11 percent. The inverted U is avoidable. In-
come distribution may be determined as much by development style and 
public policies as by the level of development. Appropriate public policy 
can be designed to avoid a deterioration in the relative distribution of in-
come and to effect an improvement in the economic status of the poor. 
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Causes of Relative Inequality 
How do a country's economic characteristics determine its income distribu-
tion? Three particularly noteworthy studies address this question. 
Adelman and Morris (1973), base their investigation on cross-sectional 
observations for forty-three LDCs. To measure income inequality, they 
used three alternative indicators: the income share of the lowest 60 percent, 
the income share of the middle quintile, and the income share of the richest 
5 percent. They report six variables as important in determining the 
distribution of income in a country: 
1. rate of improvement in human resources; 
2. direct government economic activity; 
3. socioeconomic dualism; 
4. potential for economic development; 
5. per-capita GNP; 
6. strength of labor movement. 
Interestingly, no significant relationship is found between relative income 
inequality and short-term economic-growth rates, short-term improvements 
in tax and financial institutions, or short-term increases in agricultural or 
industrial productivity. The interested reader is referred to their book for 
the proxy variables used and their specific definitions. 
The Adelman-Morris exercise has been subjected to a great deal of 
criticism, including doubts about the quality of the underlying data, 
discomfort over the lack of a well-defined theoretical framework, and skep-
ticism about the appropriateness of the statistical methods employed. These 
criticisms encourage hesitancy in accepting Adelman and Morris's conclu-
sions on the importance of the six factors listed above and the unimportance 
of others not in that list. 
A second study of causes of relative inequality, somewhat earlier but 
less well-known than that of Adelman and Morris, is that of Chiswick 
(1971). Using an elementary human-capital model, Chiswick deduced that 
variability in earned income should be functionally related (positively) to 
four factors: 
1. the inequality of investment in human capital; 
2. the average level of investment in human capital; 
3. the average level of the rate of return to human-capital investment; 
4. the inequality in the rate of return to human-capital investment. 
He then subjected these hypotheses to empirical testing in a cross section of 
nine countries, four of which are LDCs. 
r 
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Unfortunately, there are two problems: (1) there is a scarcity of data to 
test the model, and (2) what data there are (from Lydall 1968) prove in-
conclusive. In Chiswick's regressions, the variable measuring inequality of 
educational attainments is statistically significantly related (with the correct 
sign) to earnings inequality in two out of three cases. The variables for 
average per-capita GNP and rate of growth of GNP prove, with one excep-
tion, to be insignificant. Thus the hypotheses derived from the human-
capital model of earnings inequality receive only limited empirical support. 
Whether this weakness is due to limitations of the data or of Chiswick's 
specific formulation is an open question awaiting additional examination. 
Finally, recent work at the World Bank by Ahluwalia (1976) draws on 
data from sixty-two countries. For alternative indicators of relative income 
inequality, he used the income shares of the top 20 percent, middle 40 per-
cent, lowest 40 percent, and lowest 60 percent. He found a statistically 
significant relationship between income shares and per-capita GNP consis-
tent with the inverted-U pattern. However, there does not appear to be an 
independent short-term relationship between the level of inequality and the 
rate of growth of GNP. 
The explanatory variables associated with income inequality are: (1) the 
rate of expansion of education, (2) the rate of decline of demographic 
pressures, and (3) changes in the structure of production in favor of the 
modern sector. More specifically, improvement in literacy, reduced rate of 
growth of population, reduced share of agriculture in national product, and 
shifting of population to the urban sector are found to reduce relative in-
come inequality. 
The Ahluwalia study is carefully done and offers a reasonable set of 
stylized facts about the patterns of relative income inequality and their cor-
relates. 
The usual concomitants of economic development (particularly im-
proved education, reduction in the importance of agriculture, and growth 
of the urban sector) significantly lower relative income inequality. The 
evidence is mixed on the level of economic development: Both Ahluwalia 
and Adelman and Morris find a significant relationship between relative in-
equality and per-capita GNP, while Chiswick finds these effects insignifi-
cant. None of these studies finds a statistically significant relationship be-
tween the level of inequality and the rate of economic growth. They also fail 
to establish the importance of tax systems and agricultural-productivity im-
provements. 
These cross-section analyses follow a long tradition, pioneered at Har-
vard University in the last decade, of deriving conclusions about the process 
of economic development by looking at countries at different stages of 
development (Chenery 1960; Chenery and Taylor 1968; Chenery and Syr-
quin 1975). Such analyses are based on the assumption that currently 
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developing countries will follow much the same pattern in their develop-
ment experiences as is found in the cross section. Many, myself included, re-
ject this assumption. It would be better to investigate the direct evidence on 
changes in income distribution within a given country at two or more points 
in time in that country's development history. 
Evidence on Historical Trends 
Within a Country over Time 
The evidence on historical trends in income distribution within a country 
over time is scattered and has not yet been synthesized in a multicountry 
study. Much of the research is as yet unpublished, and many more studies 
are now in progress. In this section we will survey the major multicountry 
studies on this question. 
The pathbreaking contribution in the field is that of Kuznets, who in his 
1963 paper reviewed the available evidence for a number of now-developed 
countries. For two countries (Prussia and Saxony in the late 1800s), the in-
come share of those at the top of the income distribution rose or remained 
the same. In the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United States, the data show a steady decline in 
relative inequality, as measured by the income shares of the top 5 percent 
and the lowest 60 percent. 
Interestingly, this is not the usual lesson drawn from Kuznets's research. 
He wrote, "It seems plausible to assume that in the process of growth, the 
earlier periods are characterized by a balance of counteracting forces that 
may have widened the inequality in the size distribution of income for a 
while . . ." (1963, p. 67; emphasis added). One looks in vain for statistical 
evidence documenting the plausible assumption in the actual historical ex-
periences of any of the nine countries named above. Nevertheless, these two 
papers are among the best known and most widely cited as supporting the 
inverted—U hypothesis. 
Kuznets's writing stimulated development economists to study the facts 
in countries that were still less developed. The first multicountry historical 
study of the patterns of income-distribution change in LDCs was the paper 
by Weisskoff (1970) for Puerto Rico, Argentina, and Mexico. Weisskoff s 
paper includes a brief discussion of the traditional measures of relative in-
come inequality, including the Gini coefficient, the Kuznets ratio, the coef-
ficient of variation, variance of the logarithms of income, and standard or-
dinal shares. "In each of the three developing countries," he writes, "we 
noted that equality of income declined as the level of income rose over 
time" (1970, p. 317). 
In contrast to Weisskoff's interpretation of his own numbers, the 
numerical results are in fact quite mixed. In each country at least one of the 
w 
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relative-inequality measures shows an increase and at least one other 
measure shows a decline. Thus the effects of economic growth on relative 
income inequality were ambiguous in these three cases. 
The reported findings of Kuznets and Weisskoff as well as growing 
bodies of evidence from cross-sectional studies led many observers in the 
early 1970s to the view that there may be a conflict between the rate of 
growth of income and equality in the distribution of that income. If so, this 
would be a harsh dilemma. Further investigation was in order, and it was 
soon forthcoming. 
In an influential paper in an equally influential volume, Ahluwalia 
(1974) presented evidence relating the growth of income shares of the lower 
40 percent to the overall rate of growth of the economies of eighteen coun-
tries, all but a few of which are LDCs (see figure 2-3). 
The scatter suggests considerable diversity of country experience in terms 
of changes in relative equality. Several countries show a deterioration in 
relative equality but there are others showing improvement . . . there is no 
strong pattern relating changes in the distribution of income to the rate of 
growth of GNP. In both high-growth and low-growth countries there are 
some which have experienced improvements and others that have ex-
perienced deteriorations in relative equality.(emphasis added)1 
In his work, Ahluwalia did not attempt to relate the observed changes to 
countries' economic-development strategies, such as import substitution or 
export promotion. Evidence on this question would be welcome. 
The data presented by Kuznets, Weisskoff, and Ahluwalia shows that 
the supposed "harsh dilemma" of growth versus equality might be 
avoidable. 
Relative-inequality studies suggest the following stylized facts: 
In a cross section of countries, the bulk of the evidence indicates an 
inverted-U pattern in the relationship of relative income inequality with 
the level of economic development. 
However, countries' income levels explain only a small part of variabil-
ity in measured inequality. Other characteristics of the economy also 
play a role. 
Among the variables associated with cross-sectional patterns of relative 
inequality are improved education, growth of the urban sector, and the 
decline of agriculture. The evidence on the level of national income is 
mixed. Tax systems and agricultural productivity have not been shown 
to be important determinants of the cross-sectional pattern. 
In the cross section, no systematic relationship is found between the 
rate of growth of the economy and relative inequality. 
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Figure 2-3. Growth and the Lowest 40 Percent 
Similarly, changes in the relative income share of the poorest 40 percent 
of the population in the historical experience of a given country exhibit 
no marked association with the economy's growth rate. 
It may be that certain economic-development strategies, such as export 
promotion versus import substitution, tend to be related to changes in 
the relative income distribution; however, no systematic evidence has 
been gathered on this point. 
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Absolute Poverty versus Relative Inequality: 
Two Case Studies 
Do figures on relative income inequality provide suitable poverty in-
dicators? May we instead approach the question of changing income 
distribution from an absolute-poverty perspective? The relevant questions 
must address the determinants of incomes and of poverty and how these 
determinants have changed over time. 
The relative-inequality and absolute-poverty approaches may differ in 
assessing the distributional consequences of growth; whether or not they do 
is an empirical question. The available data permit intensive examination of 
two countries, Brazil and India. 
Brazil 
One of the most interesting and controversial cases of economic develop-
ment is that of Brazil. Over the decade of the 1960s, the real rate of 
economic growth was 79 percent. After allowing for a high population-
growth rate, real income per capita grew 32 percent over the decade, a 
substantial achievement by LDC standards. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Brazil experienced rates of growth approaching 10 percent per year. 
On this basis, the Brazilian case was widely heralded as an "economic 
miracle." 
Then a cloud appeared on the horizon. In an exceptionally influential 
paper, Fishlow (1972) examined the distributional question of who received 
the benefits of this growth. Using the Gini coefficient of inequality and the 
income share received by the richest 3 percent of the population, Fishlow 
observed a worsening of the relative income distribution during the 1960s, 
despite the rapid economic growth of the latter years. A similar qualitative 
conclusion was reached subsequently by Adelman and Morris (1973, p. 1) 
based on the income share of the poorest 40 percent. Some of the data 
underlying these conclusions are presented in table 2-1. 
The finding that income inequality in Brazil had increased gave pause to 
many. As a result, there is now widespread disagreement about the desirabil-
ity of taking Brazilian economic and social policies as a model for other 
developing countries to follow. It is probably fair to say that, because of 
Fishlow's paper, most observers no longer regard the Brazilian experience 
as "miraculous." 
Some economists, although not Fislow himself, inferred from this 
evidence that the growth that had taken place had been at the expense of 
the poor (Foxley 1975). A softer inference is that the poor did not share in 
the benefits of Brazilian growth. Both inferences are incorrect. They arise 
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Table 2-1 
Data on Income Distribution in Brazil 
I960 1970 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality, total 
economically active 
population" 0.59 0.63 
Income share of 
richest 3.2 percent3 27% 33% 
Income share of 
poorest 40 percentb 10% 8% 
"Source: Albert Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," American Economic 
.Review 62 (1972):391-402. 
bSource: I. Adelman and C.T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing 
Countries (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973). 
from the use of relative-inequality rather than absolute-poverty measures 
(Fields 1977). 
Absolute-poverty comparisons require data on changes in the number 
of persons with incomes below a constant real-poverty line, in this case the 
minimum wage in the poorest region of the country, the northeast. The 
cumulative percentage of population was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for 
every income bracket. The economic growth that took place in Brazil over 
the decades of the 1960s reached persons at all income levels, not just those 
at the top. 
The percentage of the economically active population with incomes 
below the Brazilian poverty level declined during the decade; those who re-
mained poor were not as poor as before; and the rate of growth of income 
among the poor was at least as great as the rate of growth among the non-
poor. 
The entire income distribution shifted in real terms, benefiting every in-
come class. There was a small decline, from 37 to 35.5 percent, in the frac-
tion of the economically active population below the poverty line. Those 
who remained "poor" experienced a marked percentage increase in real in-
come (from one-third to as much as two-thirds higher). 
The percentage increase in income for those below the poverty line was 
greater than the increase for those not in poverty, and may well have been 
twice as high or more. 
The income gap between poor and nonpoor persons narrowed in terms 
of ratios, although the absolute gap widened. The bulk of the income 
growth over the decade accrued to persons above the poverty line. A similar 
pattern is observed for the United States, an allegedly more egalitarian 
society. The poverty gap in Brazil, the sum of the differences between each 
I 
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poor person's income and the poverty line, was reduced by 41 percent be-
tween 1960 and 1970. The United States reduced its poverty gap by exactly 
the same percentage over the same decade. 
The poor in Brazil did benefit from the economic growth that took 
place during the 1960s. This conclusion can be stated with no intention of 
condoning the persistence of the severe poverty that remains, the apparent 
lack of a strong commitment by the Brazilian authorities to alleviate the 
current plight of the poor in this generation, or some of the more 
authoritarian measures reputed to have been used to ensure social stability. 
Rising Gini coefficients and income shares of the very rich are consistent 
with nontrivial improvements in the economic position of the poor. 
Relative-inequality comparisons led many to overlook important tendencies 
toward the alleviation of absolute poverty. 
India 
In India, on the other hand, the situation is very different. India is poor and 
growing slowly, with per-capita income under U.S. $100. During the 1960s, 
per-capita private-consumer expenditure grew by less than 0.5 percent per 
annum (Dandekar and Rath 1971, p. 40). India offers abundant data on the 
distribution of income and consumption dating back to the 1950s. Given the 
richness of the data in so poor a country with so large a research establish-
ment, it is not surprising that we find a multitude of income-distribution 
studies. The remarkable feature about the relative-inequality data is that no 
clear pattern of change emerges. 
Overall, as measured by the Gini coefficient, relative income inequality 
shows no particular trend. The Gini coefficient within the urban sector may 
have risen somewhat, suggesting greater inequality, but the evidence is 
mixed. The Gini coefficient within the rural sector seems to have declined, 
suggesting lesser inequality; but as with the urban Gini coefficient, no 
strong tendency is found. Possibly the income share of the bottom 20 per-
cent rose while the share of the top 20 percent fell nationwide, together sug-
gesting diminished inequality; but both changes are small. 
Given the inconclusiveness of the individual findings, the contradictory 
indications as to whether inequality increased or decreased, and the small 
magnitudes of the changes as compared with probable errors in sampling 
and measurement, the conclusion seems warranted that the pattern of 
relative inequality in India remained essentially unchanged. 
A leading Indian economist, P.K. Bardhan, takes issue with relative-
inequality measurements of income distribution. "For a desperately poor 
country like India," he writes, "there are many who believe that no 
measure of inequality which is in terms of relative distribution and is in-
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dependent of some absolute poverty standard can be entirely satisfactory" 
(1974, p. 119). Accordingly, he calculated estimates of the percentage of the 
population below a constant absolute-poverty line: 
Year Rural Urban 
1960-1961 38 32 
1964-1965 45 37 
1968-1969 54 41 
Absolute poverty worsened greatly in India between 1960-1961 and 
1968-1969, even though relative inequality did not. 
As in the case of Brazil, relative-inequality measures suggest one set of 
conclusions with respect to changing income distribution while absolute-
poverty comparisons suggest another. The discrepancy is exactly reversed: 
more absolute poverty despite apparently constant relative inequality in In-
dia, alleviation of absolute poverty despite rising relative inequality in 
Brazil. 
The choice of a relative or absolute approach does make an important 
qualitative difference. Data from Brazil suggest a worsening of the income 
distribution: The Gini coefficient was noticeably higher in 1970 than in 
1960, the share of income received by the very richest rose, and the share 
received by the very poorest fell. Focusing on absolute rather than relative 
incomes, we find that the poor in Brazil shared in economic development, 
albeit to a limited extent. Incomes of those below the Brazilian poverty line 
increased by possibly double the percentage of those above the line. 
In India, relative income inequality did not change noticeably. Some in-
ferred that India had at least held the line on income distribution. From an 
absolute-poverty perspective, however, India did not hold the line at all: 
Absolute poverty increased considerably. 
Relative-income measures disguise changes in absolute poverty among 
the poor in developing countries. They may lead to inaccurate assessments 
of commitment and progress in reducing poverty. To measure alleviation of 
absolute poverty, it is more appropriate to use absolute-poverty measures: 
the number of individuals or families with incomes below a constant real-
poverty line, or the average gap between the incomes of the poor and the 
poverty line. 
Implementing the Absolute-Poverty Approach 
A country's progress in alleviating poverty is best gauged by a measure 
designed especially for that purpose. In this section we describe what is 
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needed; demonstrate how the approach has been applied in Brazil; outline 
the present availability of data in LDCs; and, finally, explore ways to close 
the gap between data needs and data availability. 
The absolute-poverty approach requires definition of a time-invariant 
real-income figure called the poverty line. Next comes information on the 
number of persons (or families) with incomes below that line and the 
average income among them. It may also be useful to know the degree of in-
come inequality among the poor. To measure poverty alleviation in a par-
ticular country's economic development requires comparable and detailed 
figures on the size distribution of income for at least two time periods, and 
preferably more. 
Conceptually, the absolute-poverty line should be defined in such a 
way that we would not hesitate to regard an individual or family with in-
come below that figure as poor (Webb 1976). A straightforward way of 
doing this is to establish a dollar-income figure, chosen as scientifically as 
possible. In the United States, for example, the poverty line was derived 
by ascertaining the amount of money needed to purchase a nutritionally 
adequate diet consistent with the food preferences of the poorest groups in 
the population, and then multiplying this figure by a factor of three, since 
the poor spend about one-third of their incomes on food (Orshansky 
1965). As one LDC example, in Brazil the poverty line is taken as the 
minimum wage in the northeast (Brazil's poorest region), adjusted in other 
parts of the country for cost-of-living differences (Fishlow 1972). Another 
LDC example, based on consumption rather than income, is found in 
Ferber and Musgrove (1976). In both cases, the specific income figure 
depends on family size. 
In India, the Planning Commission used a figure of 20 rupees (Rs.20) 
per month (in 1960-1961 prices) per capita as the nutritionally minimal stan-
dard. This figure was modified by other researchers: Dandekar and Rath 
(1971) took Rs.15 per capita per month for rural poverty and Rs.22.5 for 
urban, while Bardhan (1970,1974) used Rs.15 and Rs.18 respectively (1974, 
pp. 119-123). The World Bank has estimated the population below U.S. $50 
per capita, and AID has suggested an international per-capita figure of $150 
per capita (see table 1-1). 
Provided that the poverty line chosen bears a reasonable relationship to 
living standards in the country in question, there is little advantage in wor-
rying about what the exact dollar figure should be. Absolute-income stan-
dards such as $150 per capita or the minimum wage in the country are 
reasonable benchmarks. 
What is important, indeed crucial, about the absolute-poverty line in a 
dynamic-development context is that it be held constant in real terms, that 
is, after adjusting for inflation. No other adjustment (for example, an ad-
justment for productivity growth) is appropriate (Bacha 1976). 
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In empirical research, as a check on the arbitrariness of any given pov-
erty line, one might experiment with simple multiples of that line, as Bar-
dhan did in India, to test whether similar changes in the incidence and 
severity of poverty are found. In this way, disputes over the correctness of 
any specific poverty-line definition are minimized; and attention is directed 
where it should be, namely, at the constancy of the line itself and the 
distribution of the population around it. 
Application of the Absolute-Poverty 
Approach to Brazil 
For Brazil, figures on the size distribution of income are available for 1960 
and 1970 from a variety of sources. The published figures need to be ad-
justed for inflation. Taking the poverty line as new Cruzeiros (NCr.) 2,100 
in 1960 units, and allowing for an overall inflation factor of 3.53, we need 
data on the percentage of population below NCr. 7,413 ($2,100 x 3.53) in 
1970 and on the incomes of those persons. 
Approximating income distributions is a tricky business when data are 
missing. A simple linear-interpolation procedure or a log-linear or some 
other apprpximation shows that the qualitative conclusions about changes 
in absolute poverty are robust to any assumption that one might make that 
is consistent with the data (Fields 1976b). 
These problems could easily be resolved by recourse to the underlying 
microeconomic data. All that would be required would be to tabulate the 
population into income groups after first adjusting for an inflation factor; 
for example, in the case of Brazil, by dividing all 1970 incomes by 3.53 so as 
to make them comparable with 1960 incomes, or equivalently, by multiply-
ing all 1960 incomes by this same factor. This is something the Central 
Statistical Office in Brazil could easily do. 
Availability of Data in Less-Developed Countries 
Recent years have witnessed extensive gathering of data on the size distribu-
tion of income in less-developed countries. The most important compila-
tions include those by: 
1. Jain (1975) at the World Bank; 
2. Adelman and Morris (1973); 
3. Paukert (1973) at the International Labour Office; 
4. Altimir (1974), reporting on work under a joint Economic Commission 
for Latin America-World Bank project; 
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5. a compendium of six papers—by Choo (1975), Meesook (1975a), Ra-
jaraman (1975), Phillips (1975), Urrutia (1975), and Langoni 
(1975)—commissioned by the Princeton University-Brookings Institu-
tion project on income distribution in less-developed countries; 
6. Musgrove (1976b), reporting on work under the auspices of the Program 
of Joint Studies of Latin American Economic Integration (ECIEL) in 
conjunction with the Brookings Institution. 
These sources are described in appendix 2A. 
Income-distribution data for two or more points in time are available 
for only twenty less-developed countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, India, Ivory Coast, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thai-
land, Tunisia, and Venezuela. Availability of data alone is not sufficient to 
permit income-distribution comparisons. At a minimum, definitions of in-
come and coverage of the censuses or surveys must be directly comparable. 
None of the compilations offering income-distribution data for more than 
one point in time ensure comparability. Even in the best of circumstances, 
where the data appear reasonably comparable over time, cost-of-living ad-
justments and interpolations of the income distribution must be made. No 
LDC publishes the kind of income-distribution data adjusted for inflation 
that permit application of absolute-poverty measures without further ad-
justments. 
For only a handful of countries can we look back and reconstruct 
figures on income distribution and poverty for more than two years. The 
possibility of monitoring the progress made by countries toward alleviating 
poverty (in the same way that we can monitor annual GNP growth rates, for 
instance) looks bleak indeed. 
Closing the Gap Between Data 
Needs and Data Availability 
Four specific steps can make more data on changes in income distribution 
and poverty alleviation available: 
1. The Jain data should be used for income-distribution and absolute-
poverty calculations, both at a point in time and over time in those 
countries for which the intertemporal data are reasonably comparable. 
2. This same process should be followed using the microeconomic data in 
the original questionnaires or computer tapes and avoiding interpola-
tion. 
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3. New censuses and surveys should be designed and financed, and ongo-
ing ones should be encouraged to provide data that are comparable 
with respect to definition, scope, and coverage. 
4. As the results of income-distribution and absolute-poverty studies 
become available, an international agency could usefully process these 
figures and issue the results in periodic reports. 
One finding from this review of the available data and their limitations 
is the virtual impossibility of regularly monitoring the progress and commit-
ment of one hundred or so LDCs on the income-distribution front. The 
data do not permit it, nor will they soon do so. There are nationwide 
income-distribution data for just forty-seven of these countries and data on 
changes in income distribution for only twenty. It will be many years before 
information on changes in income distribution and poverty become 
available for even a majority of these countries. Over the next several years, 
information will trickle in on progress in improving the economic position 
of the poor and on the determinants of that progress or lack thereof. In the 
interim, some other basis must be used to decide where progress is taking 
place. 
Conclusions 
This chapter is a response to interest in greater equality of income distribu-
tion as a goal of economic development. Greater equality of income 
distribution may be thought of as demonstrable improvement in the 
economic position of the poor. How rapidly poverty is being alleviated is 
very much worth knowing, but there is little information on the subject at 
present. 
There is a very real danger in using any measure as an indicator of a 
country's commitment to alleviating poverty. These measures cannot tell us 
what was possible nor how well the country did in relation to how well it 
might have done. Countries that show little progress in alleviating poverty 
may find themselves in this sorry state because they have so very far to go 
and so very little to do it with, rather than because they have not tried. 
The state of the art is not far enough advanced to provide guidance on 
how to take these factors into account in deriving an adequate measure of 
progress relative to potential. This point applies not only to income 
distribution; it pertains also to improvements in agricultural productivity 
and nutrition and to reductions in unemployment and infant mortality as 
criteria for assessing a given country's commitment to improving the 
economic position of its poor. 
In gauging commitment to the poor as a criterion for receipt of aid, sim-
ple screening processes would help avoid those countries in which the aid 
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funds are clearly being funneled into the hands of the rich or of corrupt 
government officials. Beyond that, in choosing which countries merit 
assistance, donors might do well to continue to identify the large groups of 
poor and to channel resources accordingly. For this purpose, data on in-
come distribution, despite their limitations, are invaluable. 
